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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 000198

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STATE FOR WHA/CAR  
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SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD  
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR LAC/CAR  
INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA)  
WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2017

TAGS: [PREL](#) [PKO](#) [UNSC](#) [HA](#)

SUBJECT: MINUSTAH OFFICERS' THOUGHTS ON MANDATE RENEWAL

REF: A. 06 PORT AU PRINCE 2453  
[1B.](#) 06 PORT AU PRINCE 1417

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Classified By: Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).).

[11.](#) (SBU) Summary: MINUSTAH's Political Affairs Director Gerald Lechevallier told Poloff on January 26 that he would like the new mandate to reaffirm resolution 1702 (establishing MINUSTAH) and maintain Security Council commitment to a long-term stabilization force in Haiti. Added to the new mandate, Lechevallier would like to see a commitment to start vetting the judiciary, provide GoH customs procedures with adequate security, and commit additional troops, as well as more specialized UN police officers such as two SWAT teams (one full-time in Cite Soleil and one in Cap Haitien) and anti-kidnapping experts. Lechevallier said that over the next year, he hoped that donors would better coordinate their efforts using the UN as its coordination mechanism. He also hoped that the UN would reinforce its institutional strengthening efforts in Haiti. Meanwhile, after a rise in anti-MINUSTAH protests last year, operations targeting gang members in Port-au-Prince slums have prompted popular approval ratings of the UN mission here. End summary.

Vetting the Judiciary, Support to Customs, Specialized Forces

[12.](#) (SBU) According to Lechevallier, in light of the success the international community is having with vetting the police, the next step is to start vetting the judiciary. Relations between the police and the judiciary are weakening as the Haitian National Police (HNP) make moves to clean up their operations. MINUSTAH political affairs officer Ayaka Suzuki added that the judiciary reacted strongly to the speech made by the HNP Director General Mario Andresol in December 2006 (ref A), largely to "resist in advance efforts by the GoH and international community to start vetting judiciary officials." Suzuki added that Justice Minister Rene Magloire had expressed his full cooperation to vet the judiciary, but that he does not have the support of other officials in his ministry.

13. (SBU) Lechevallier and Suzuki discussed the increasing resistance that the GoH is facing in regards to customs duties. As the government attempts to impose import/export taxes, it is meeting resistance from those who have been operating without the added fees for years. Citing the recent strike in Malpasse on the Haitian-Dominican Republic border in 2006 (ref B), Suzuki said that the GoH requested MINUSTAH's presence because HNP officers were not able provide adequate security at the border crossing. Insecurity is threatening officials who are trying to impose taxes on importers at the main port in Port-au-Prince, where MINUSTAH could also provide targeted support as the GoH attempts to normalize its operations.

14. (SBU) Lechevallier stressed that MINUSTAH needs more troops for three reasons: as police officers are vetted "part-time criminals become full-time criminals," the Haitian population has higher expectations of MINUSTAH, and criminal deportees are adding to the number of violent elements in Port-au-Prince. He explained that for all the available information on the kidnappers in the news, on television, and through community-based knowledge, MINUSTAH has not taken an active role in targeting the kidnapping operations because it does not have specialized forces.

Coordinate Donor Efforts, Reinforce Institutional Strengthening

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15. (SBU) Lechevallier also asked that donors better coordinate their efforts in some key areas. Using the example of vehicles recently donated to the HNP, Lechevallier said that there have been five separate donations of different vehicles; in one case Brazil donated Brazilian made cars for which there are no spare parts or mechanics in

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Haiti. He stressed that the UN does not need to take the credit, but that they should play a role in coordinating/approving donor aid and donations. This would maximize the comparative advantage of the donors in Haiti, and put an end to "double-dipping" on the part of Haitian officials, he said in reference to a recent scam by parliamentarians to receive funding from more than one donor for the same project.

16. (SBU) Lechevallier and Suzuki both stressed that MINUSTAH should continue its institutional strengthening component of the mandate, and focus its efforts on key institutions such as the planning ministry, parliament and the prime minister's office. The planning ministry in particular should be turned into a "donor fortress" made up of Haitian officials and international overseers. Assistance to parliament, too, should be better coordinated. The legislators have nothing to do and little office space; yet they are overburdened by 900 public servants working for them, Lechevallier explained.

The parliamentarians are asking for technical assistance. The UN mission could work with the international community to introduce discipline and order, and even incentives, at parliament. With cleaner and more efficient institutions, it will be easier to give money to the GoH and to coordinate donor efforts within the institutions.

A Few Last Thoughts

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17. (SBU) Lechevallier thought that the UN's Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program should remain in the mandate, but that strategies such as national dialogue and reconciliation should be removed. MINUSTAH should no longer play a role in organizing the elections; however, there are many more areas where MINUSTAH could play a role, such as constructing temporary prisons to deal with overcrowding. The two political officers stressed that there was no way to negotiate with China's latest proposal to

shorten the mandate to six months and include a draw-down component.

18. (C) Comment: Though we might debate what is the appropriate level of detail to include in the renewed MINUSTAH mandate, Lechevallier's point on vetting the judiciary is well taken. A USAID team recently concluded an exercise to design its future program to support justice reform and came to the same conclusion, and post supports vetting of judges and prosecutors wholeheartedly. On other topics, Lechevallier holds firm views on subjects not always within his professional purview and where his interventions are not always appropriate. For example, we opted not to report on his unsolicited advice regarding the composition of our UNPol contingent. As a result of his rocky tenure as head of MINUSTAH's Electoral Assistance Unit and public rift with former Provisional Electoral Council Director Jacques Bernard, Lechevallier is a controversial figure among both Haitians and the international community. In any case, SRSG Mulet continues to seek Lechevallier's counsel, and consequently his thinking influences MINUSTAH policy.

SANDERSON